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AMBAssAdor gAllEgos
thank you for this invitation to the law school, it is an honor to be here. I will be touching on a few elements which I think pertain to the experience of the Committee 
on this issue. First of all, of course, we are talking about norma-
tive incorporation, and we can see in the convention, Articles 
1 through 15, all of them have issues of incorporation. I’d like 
to present you with various scenarios. One of them of course is 
that a state incorporates, but just as we have just heard from the 
Special Rapporteur, the majority of 125 countries have not, or 
are unwilling to, or don’t, criminalize this as much as we would 
wish. Some of them have done it partially which I would call 
the second category. Incomplete incorporation means that it is 
not within their constitutional framework, it is in their secondary 
law or procedural law, or it might not even be in any of those. 
We have experience of many countries coming to us to report 
that they are in the process, which could be the third category, 
those in progress, and there are of course those who simply 
do not have them in their legal framework although they have 
signed the Convention. We have 125 states that have signed the 
convention, that means about 78% of the 192 states that form 
the UN. The guidelines that the committee has had since 1991 
are, fundamentally, to ask the countries to incorporate, and it 
is recommended that they do incorporate. So every time the 
Committee sits down to review a state’s compliance, they are 
asked to analyze and explain why they haven’t incorporated. I 
think that the Rapporteurs are very insistent on the procedure as 
to why they have not incorporated this into their legal frame-
work. The actual issue also has to do with jurisdiction. I do think 
we are talking about the basis of what we would call the political 
willingness. Are states willing to do this? 
Of course you have to have a principle for states to sign a 
treaty and have their parliaments ratify it. But are they willing, 
do they have the political will, to do this? Most of the states of 
the world do not like to be monitored by international organi-
zations or international conventions, which set up a body of 
experts. 
In a few days is the first meeting of the human rights 
Convention on Persons with Disabilities, which is a step in the 
right direction. As we have these treaty bodies which comply 
with the enforceable obligations of states, the states have signed 
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them and ratified them and now they have to comply with them 
. . . but I would say that many don’t. If we wish to look into 
this further, the progress of the Committee, you will find that 
the number of countries that have not even presented their first 
reports . . . I would say that there are 38 countries which have 
not presented their initial reports. Fifty-six haven’t presented 
their 2nd, and so on. So if you add up the numbers, a large num-
ber of countries are not reporting. 
The problem is that we have a major backlog, so the 
Secretariat is backlogged, and so is the Committee. We have 
something like reports of 40 countries that we haven’t been 
able to deal with in the Committee Against Torture, and maybe 
someone can give us a more precise number on that, but the 
Committee is going to have to duplicate its sessions to deal with 
these issues, and not only duplicate them but be more efficient, 
which is another issue of how the committees that monitor these 
conventions are not operating in an effective sense. 
If someone is tortured today, by the time the Committee 
meets to deal with this, it might take years. We need a more 
effective system of monitoring, we need a more effective system 
of having states comply with their international obligations. Of 
course, you have to also be very proactive. Let me divide this 
into three aspects. One is technical assistance; I do think that 
the Committee has to have the capacity to give states technical 
assistance for the compliance to the convention. I am not talking 
about prevention. I think that is a very valuable step, but I think 
the actual problem is that we have torture. And as the Special 
Rapporteurs just said, it is generalized and systematic and we are 
not getting to the roots of how to eliminate it. 
As I just confessed to you, I am a lawyer, but I do not believe 
that the majority of problems can be solved by law, there also 
must be a change in society. We have to change how society 
views this in its interior essence. And that is the change we are 
looking for. In the realm of human rights we need a revolution-
ary proposal, to change societies. You have to change the way 
an individual looks at it, a family looks at it, and society looks 
at it. I think we also need to have a conscious building effort in 
the world. 
We were talking about issues of how torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatments and punishments have been 
dealt with in the last few years, especially in the context of ter-
rorism, and let me just say that as a practitioner, I have found 
that governments have had verbal agreements on intelligence, 
which I find very disturbing. I do not condone the ability of 
intelligence services to have verbal agreements. 
The accountability of democracy, and of civil authorities 
democratically elected to overview the procedures under which 
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their police forces and military forces are working, is key. 
Coming from Latin America, and I think Claudio will agree 
with me, they have been subject to dictatorships which have had 
a very long span of activities, so we need to enforce a procedure 
to subject the military and police to civilian oversight. 
Having shared time with the Dean, I’d like to conclude with 
three major issues: 
•   First of all, we need to promote the political will of states 
parties. And the only way a state party does this is if civil 
society, NGOs, and political institutions prompt it to do so. 
If we don’t have that, a state won’t move in the right direc-
tion. This can be done in a democratic system; the majority 
of countries in the world, I hope, are or will be democra-
cies, but everyone has its particularity. This is something 
that we should work on diligently. 
•   Second,  we  need  the  financial  and  human  resources  in 
order for these committees to address this adequately and 
so that commissions in their own territorial states can do 
this. So as we broaden the aspect of individual commis-
sions to deal with this in the individual territories or under 
universal jurisdiction, we have to be able to prompt them 
and we have to be able to define the issues of what we are 
dealing with when we talk about torture, when we talk 
about cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as a vision 
of societies, as a vision of how societies comply with 
their obligations. We have to try to do something that is 
very difficult, and that is what most impressed me from 
President Obama – we must have transparency. Can we get 
true government transparency, do we have the capability of 
having agreements that are negotiated and signed that are 
not under the board, that are not capable of rendition, or 
jails flying in the skies, or having the capability of look-
ing at this through democratically framed institutions? If 
we are capable of that, I think the committees can work 
better. 
•   Third,  in  the  solving  the  backlog  of  this Committee,  the 
only way we can do this is to stress the compliance of 
countries and to accompany civil societies in this effort.
dEAn grossMAn
domestic incorPoration of international treaty obliga-
tions is essential. First, there are “technical” reasons which 
explain this importance, namely, that the traditional supervisory 
mechanisms established by classic international law are weak. 
In fact, under classic international law, as the International 
Court of Justice has stated, treaties typically establish reciprocal 
obligations among state parties that allow one of the “aggrieved” 
states to depart from its own obligations when the other state is 
in non-compliance. This type of state supervision – “horizontal 
supervision” – was the sole mechanism for supervising compli-
ance with treaties during the classic period of international law. 
Human rights treaties, because of their humanitarian purpose, 
establish nonreciprocal obligations among states. Accordingly, 
violations by one state are not considered acceptable grounds 
for derogation, in turn, by other states from their own human 
rights obligations. 
Taking into account the nonreciprocal nature of state obliga-
tions under human rights treaties, horizontal supervision is not 
the best-suited mechanism for ensuring compliance. Moreover, 
state supervision – of compliance with human rights norms – by 
other states often does not take place absent other state interests 
(e.g., security, political, etc.). As a result, action is not guaran-
teed and, when it does take place, it is open to criticism aimed at 
questioning its legitimacy.
In light of the pitfalls of horizontal supervision, the inter-
national community created collective systems of supervision: 
political; semi-judicial (which combines judicial with politi-
cal elements); and judicial (that resembles the judiciary in a 
domestic setting). The political supervision (e.g., the General 
Assemblies of the United Nations and of the Organization of 
American States) allows for recordkeeping and public debate 
that on occasion can limit the discretion of states when they fail 
to react to human rights violations. However, collective political 
supervision ultimately depends on a calculated political interest 
and lacks the legitimacy accruing to action based on the rule of 
law as determined by independent third parties. As such, the 
semi-judicial and judicial forms of supervision are preferable 
from the perspective of legitimacy, particularly when composed 
of organs with independent and qualified experts, and where 
individuals have rights of action to present petitions alleging 
human rights violations. While there are meaningful develop-
ments and improvements in the area of international supervi-
sion, particularly at the regional level, this process is still under 
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focus on the importance of incorporating international human 
rights obligations into the domestic realm.
While we pursue domestic incorporation, we should also 
recognize the need to promote the transformation of classic 
international law principles that consider the matter of incor-
poration a purely domestic issue typically to be decided by the 
constitutional norms of each state. Again, states under inter-
national law were free to decide whether a special act of incor-
poration, e.g., a statute, was required, or whether international 
norms would be applied directly – either by sheer ratification of 
a treaty or by considering customary law applicable in certain 
circumstances. Human rights obligations such as the prohibition 
against torture, summary executions and genocide, created a 
different type of obligation than those typically existing under 
classic inter national law. To take the law seriously requires, 
at a certain point, transforming classic international law with 
regard to these types of obligations so that their application in 
the domestic setting becomes a matter of international law and 
is not left to state discretion. Needless to say, this process of 
grounding such  obligations in international law will not happen 
overnight; but what is ultimately at stake here, is the legitimacy 
of international law itself and, perhaps, of law in general. In fact, 
if a state declares that it will not torture and ratifies a treaty to 
that effect, the very same concept of law deteriorates if the state 
is then  permitted to claim that while violation of the prohibi-
tion of  torture may generate international responsibility, such 
prohibition cannot be enforced in the domestic legal system. 
Hence, a dual-pronged approach – strengthening international 
supervision and the domestic incorporation of international 
 obligations – should continue while the transformation of classic 
international law itself is presented as a vital aspect of achieving 
compliance with human rights norms. 
As to the means currently available to achieving domestic 
incorporation of international law, two positive case examples 
from the United States provide interesting comparative mate-
rial. One is the trial of Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr., the son of 
former Liberian president Charles Taylor, Sr. Initially detained 
and convicted on charges of passport fraud in March of 2006, 
Chuckie Taylor was eventually charged with torture – after U.S. 
investigations, prompted in part by human rights groups such as 
Human Rights Watch – for his conduct in Liberia while head of 
the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), an elite pro-government military 
unit established by his father, Charles Taylor, Sr., shortly after 
taking office. A November 2007 indictment charged Chuckie 
Taylor with five counts of torture, one count of conspiracy to 
torture, one count of using a firearm during a violent crime, and 
one count of conspiracy to use a firearm during a violent crime. 
The conduct charged included committing forms of torture such 
as burning victims with molten plastic, lit cigarettes, scalding 
water, candle wax and an iron; severely beating victims with 
firearms; cutting and stabbing victims; and shocking victims 
with an electric device.1 
Taylor was tried in the United States under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), the first ever prosecution on 
torture charges under that statute. He was recently sentenced 
by U.S. District Court Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga to 97 years 
in prison for crimes involving torture in Liberia between April 
1999 and July 2003.2 In this case, the conviction was the result 
of an explicit normative instrument – the TVPA – that allows 
the domestic judiciary to act and enforce international treaty 
obligations. 
Similarly, it is important to mention the landmark Filártiga 
v. Peña-Irala case, which set a precedent for imposing civil 
tort liability upon non-citizens in the United States for viola-
tion of the law of nations.3 The Filártiga decision was adopted 
under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, also known as the Alien 
Tort Claims Act, which allows a non-citizen to sue another 
non-citizen only for a tort committed in violation of the law 
of nations. In Filártiga, two Paraguayan citizens (a father and 
daughter) sued a Paraguayan government official for the act of 
torturing, in Paraguay, a relative (their son and brother, respec-
tively), upon their learning of that official’s presence in the U.S. 
on a visa that had since expired. Under the Alien Tort Statute, a 
U.S. court ordered that damages in the amount of $10.3 million 
be paid to the plaintiffs.4 A body of jurisprudence developed 
following this case that explicitly recognized that official torture 
and comparable universal offenses constitute violations not only 
of international law, but also of U.S. federal common law.5 
These two cases illustrate that in the United States, as in 
other countries, there are normative possibilities for incorpora-
tion of international human rights law into the domestic realm. 
Expansion of these possibilities will contribute to the achieve-
ment of the more ambitious goal, namely, the transformation of 
classic international law so that human rights obligations will 
always be enforceable, both domestically and internationally, on 
the basis of international law itself.   HRB
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release, ROY BELFAST 
JR., AKA CHUCKIE TAYLOR, CONVICTED ON TORTURE 
CHARGES, October 20, 2008.
2 Department of Justice Press Release, January 9, 2009.
3 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996) (reaffirm-
ing Filártiga by stating that the court “ha[s] neither the authority 
nor the inclination to retreat from that ruling”). In Filártiga and its 
progeny, numerous federal courts construed the Alien Tort Statute/
EndnotEs: domestic Incorporation of obligations under the Convention against torture
Alien Tort Claims Act to permit aliens to sue foreign officials for 
acts of torture, summary execution, disappearance, and similar 
universal crimes committed under color of state law. For  analysis 
and discussion of the leading cases, see Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 yale l.J. 2347 (1991) 
and the Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication 
of International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 41 st. louis u. l.J. 539 (1997) (analyzing ATS/ATCA 
decisions).
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